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NEIGHBORHOOD PARKING PROGRAMS: ARE THEY 
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY DISCRIMINATORY? 
Michelle D. Miller* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
. {Zloning is a complex and important function of the State. It may 
indeed be the most essential function performed by local government, 
for it is one of the primary means by which we protect that sometimes 
difficult to define concept of quality of life. I 
The state has the authority to enact zoning legislation through its 
broad discretionary powers to provide for the health, safety and 
welfare of the public. This power is derived from the Tenth Amend-
ment to the Constitution which provides: "The powers not dele-
gated to the United States by the Constitution nor prohibited by it 
to the States, are reserved to the States, respectively or to the peo-
pie." Traditionally the state delegates this authority to the munici-
pality, particularly in the instance of zoning ordinances aimed at 
traffic control and the parking of automobiles.2 The municipality is 
generally accorded wide flexibility to adapt its regulations to exist-
ing conditions. In response to serious traffic congestion problems 
having an adverse impact on the "quality of life," several munici-
palities throughout the United States have enacted neighborhood 
parking programs which create parking privileges for residents. 
More specifically, the municipal ordinances exempt residents of an 
entire city,3 or residents of a particular neighborhood within a city,~ 
• Staff Member, ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS. 
I Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 13 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasis 
added). 
2 6 E. MCQUILUN, MUNICIPAL CORPS., 24.35 (3d ed. 1969). 
3 This is the type of program upheld in Commonwealth v. Petralia, 77 Mass. Adv. Sh. 860, 
362 N.E.2d 513 (1977). See text at note 5, infra. 
j This is the type of program which was struck down in County Bd. v. Richards, 217 Va. 
645, 231 S.E.2d 231 (1977). See text at note 6, infra. 
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from certain parking prohibitions. The exempted residents are is-
sued permits for display on their automobiles which entitle them to 
park in areas identified by some type of "parking-by-permit-only" 
sign. 
Recently the constitutionality of several of the neighborhood 
parking programs has been challenged by individuals who have 
been prohibited from parking in the restricted areas. One such chal-
lenge occurred in Cambridge, Massachusetts, in the case 
Commonwealth u. Petralia. 5 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court held that the Cambridge permit parking plan did not violate 
the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In 
County Board u. Richards,s however, the Virginia Supreme Court 
decided that the disparate treatment accorded to residents and non-
residents under the permit parking plan was an unconstitutionally 
discriminatory attempt to remedy Arlington County's commuter 
traffic problems. 
Arlington County, dissatisfied with its state court's rejection of 
the parking plan, filed a petition for a writ of certiorari seeking 
review by the United States Supreme Court. The petition stressed 
an arguable conflict between the highest courts of the states of 
Massachusetts and Virginia, since a neighborhood parking plan had 
withstood a constitutional challenge in Commonwealth u. Petralia.7 
The amicus curiae briefs in support of certiorari submitted by 
Montgomery County, Maryland8 and the United States,9 stressed 
the need for the Court's resolution of any conflict in favor of the 
constitutionality of the parking programs. They argued in part that 
neighborhood parking programs are an effective means of achieving 
compliance with federal Clean Air ActIO standards, and that the 
, 77 Mass. Adv. Sh. 860, 362 N.E.2d 513 (1977). 
, 217 Va. 645, 231 S.E.2d 231 (1977). 
7 77 Mass. Adv. Sh. 860, 362 N.E.2d 513 (1977). 
• Brief of Amicus Curiae Montgomery County, Maryland in Support of Certiorari, County 
Bd. v. Richards, 217 Va. 645, 231 S.E.2d 231 (1977). The interest of Montgomery County, 
Maryland is as follows: In 1974 the County adopted a plan which operates similarly to the 
Arlington plan. A Bethesda businessman appealled his conviction, claiming a violation of his 
constitutional rights. The Circuit Court of Montgomery County, Maryland in State v. 
Thompson, Crim. No. 19018 (March 16, 1977) held that the ordinance violated the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution. 
• Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Certiorari, County 
Bd. v. Richards, 217 Va. 645, 231 S.E.2d 231 (1977). The memorandum was filed by the 
Solicitor General, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Assistant to the Solicitor General and 
attorneys for the Department of Justice. 
'0 The Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857a - 18571 (Supp. IV 1974) (as amended and renum-
bered 95 P.L. No. 95, 91 Stat. 685 (1977)). See text at note 136, infra. 
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forced discontinuation of the program would inhibit Clean Air Act 
implementation. Certiorari was granted, and on October 12, 1977, 
in a brief, unsigned opinion, the United States Supreme Court set 
aside the decision of the Supreme Court of Virginia which had inval-
idated the Arlington neighborhood parking program. 11 
Since the Court offered only a limited expression of its reasoning 
in reversing the Virginia decision, inquiry into the constitutionality 
of neighborhood parking plans requires examination, in light of cur-
rent constitutional doctrine, of state rulings on the issue. 12 This 
article will undertake such an examination with primary reference 
to County Board u. Richardsl3 and Commonwealth u. Petralia, 14 
since these are the most recent decisions pro and con and represent 
the opinions of the highest courts of the respective states. The arti-
cle will discuss the local conditions prompting enactment of the 
permit parking plans in Arlington County, Virginia, and Cam-
bridge, Massachusetts. In order to then determine the constitution-
ality of the plans it is necessary to survey the two-tiered standard 
of review formulated by the United States Supreme Court in equal 
protection cases. To determine whether the higher standard of re-
" County Bd. v. Richards, 98 S.Ct. 24 (1977) (per curiam). The Court stated in pertinent 
part: "To reduce air pollution and other environmental effects of automobile commuting, a 
community may reasonably restrict on-street parking available to commuters, thus encourag-
ing reliance on car pools and mass transit ... [and] reducing noise, traffic hazards, and 
litter .... [T]he Constitution does not outlaw these social and environmental objectives 
.... " [d. at 26. 
" In addition to the above mentioned state decisions, the District of Columbia Superior 
Court and the Supreme Court of Ohio have also addressed the question of the constitution-
ality of permit parking programs. In Business and Professional Ass'n. v. District of Columbia, 
Civ. No. 7472-76 (D.C. Superior Court, Aug. 9, 1976), the court issued a preliminary injunc-
tion on the basis of unconstitutionality, enjoining the implementation of a permit parking 
program in that jurisdiction. Upon further proceedings the suit was dismissed and an appeal 
of the dismissal is pending. In State v. Whisman, 24 Ohio Misc. 59, 263 N.E.2d 411 (1970), 
the court invalidated an ordinance which prohibited parking on two streets except by permit 
to residents of those streets. The court held not only that the ordinance was unconstitu-
tionally discriminatory, but that it unconstitutionally attempted to "vest ungoverned and 
unbridled discretion in the Safety Director by failing to provide standards or criteria for his 
guidance." [d. at 64, 263 N.E.2d at 415. In addition to this particular infirmity of the ordi-
nance a crucial distinction between Whisman and the other cases which have addressed this 
issue (aside from the factual differences in the programs) is that New Boston, Ohio, which 
enacted the ordinance, is a tiny community with a total population of 3,325 according to the 
1970 census figures. A locality of this size could not possibly experience the traffic congestion 
and pollution problems experienced by larger cities, nor was it faced with a federal mandate 
to control auto emissions. Due to these distinguishing features, Whisman is not considered 
in this inquiry. 
13 217 Va. 645, 231 S.E.2d 231 (1977). 
" 77 Mass. Adv. Sh. 860, 362 N.E.2d 513 (1977). 
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view, "strict scrutiny," is triggered, the article will investigate 
whether the residency classification is traditionally suspect, or 
whether the plans abridge fundamental personal rights, such as the 
right to travel. If strict scrutiny is not triggered the appropriate 
standard of review is "minimum rationality," which is based on the 
classification having a rational relationship to a legitimate state 
objective. Thus, the article will consider whether the legislative 
objectives of the parking plans are within the parameters of the 
state's police power. If so they will be deemed legitimate and the 
analysis will shift to the critical question of the rationality of the 
plans. 
ll. CASE DESCRIPTIONS: ARLINGTON COUNTY v. RICHARDS AND 
COMMONWEALTH v. PETRALIA 
Arlington County is a small densely populated community with 
approximately 157,000 residents living in 25.75 square miles. IS The 
residential neighborhood where the permit parking ordinance was 
operative adjoins a district of large office and commercial buildings 
called Crystal City. The residential zone has 192 spaces along por-
tions of three streets containing 101 residences in 81 buildings. The 
most thorough sampling demonstrated that 188 of the 192 spaces 
were occupied, and that the drivers and passengers of 156 of the 
parked cars were headed for Crystal City.\8 Commuter traffic at-
tendant to the Crystal City complex became an area of concern to 
local authorities, and this concern is reflected in the stated legisla-
tive objectives of the Arlington permit parking ordinanceY 
An action challenging the constitutionality of the ordinance was 
brought by a group of commuters who worked in Crystal City. All 
plaintiffs, with the exception of Rudolph Richards, commuted to 
work by driving their own automobile. Most of them had been park-
ing all day, every working day, on the residential streets covered by 
the plan. Rudolph Richards lived within walking distance of his 
workplace at Crystal City, although the particular street on which 
he resided was not covered by the plan. Richards argued at trial that 
his inability to park on the streets in front of his neighbors' homes 
(while his neighbors were free to park in front of his home) denied 
.. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 3, County Bd. v. Richards, 217 Va. 645, 231 S.E.2d 
231 (1977). 
I. [d. at 4-5. 
17 See text at note 97, infra. 
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him equal protection of the laws. IS All commuting plaintiffs joined 
in the equal protection challenge attempting to demonstrate that 
the problems which the ordinance was designed to remedy did not 
exist, or in the alternative that the problems were not caused by 
commuters.19 The County introduced evidence to demonstrate the 
rational basis of its legislative judgment that permit parking would 
alleviate serious traffic congestion problems caused by commuters.20 
The Arlington County Circuit Court enjoined enforcement of the 
ordinance, finding the plan violative of the equal protection clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. 21 The court indicated that the evi-
dence presented at trial did not demonstrate that the classification 
made by the ordinance bore any reasonable relationship to the 
stated objectives.22 The Virginia Supreme Court affirmed, holding 
"that the ordinance on its face offends the equal protection guaran-
tee of the 14th Amendment."23 The United States Supreme Court, 
on certiorari review, reversed, stating that "[t]o reduce air pollu-
tion and other environmental effects of automobile commuting, a 
community reasonably may restrict on-street parking available to 
commuters, thus encouraging reliance on car pools and mass 
transit. "24 
The Cambridge, Massachusetts permit parking plan covers sev-
eral residential neighborhoods within the city. Defendant Petralia 
was prosecuted for illegally parking his automobile in a "parking-
by-permit-only" area of East Cambridge adjacent to the Middlesex 
District Court House. The court house had reportedly generated 
traffic problems for the residents of East Cambridge, and local offi-
cials sought to alleviate those problems by enactment of the permit 
parking plan.25 
On May 6, 1975, complaints issued in the Third District Court of 
" Respondent's Brief in Opposition to Certiorari at 6, County Bd. v. Richards, 217 Va. 645, 
231 S.E.2d 231 (1977). 
" [d. at 5 . 
.. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 5, County Bd. v. Richards, 217 Va. 645, 231 S.E.2d 
231 (1977). 
21 Richards v. County Bd., In Chancery No. 24659 (Circuit Court of Arlington County, Va., 
1975), an unreported opinion reprinted in Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 21a-22a App. B. 
22 [d. 
23 County Bd. v. Richards, 217 Va. 645, _, 231 S.E.2d 231,235 (1977). 
21 County Bd. v. Richards, 98 S.Ct. 24, 26 (1977) (per curiam) . 
.. Record at 8, Commonwealth v. Fishman, No. 729 (Middlesex Superior Court, Mass., 
1976) (companion case to Commonwealth v. Petralia, 77 Mass. Adv. Sh. 860, 362 N.E.2d 513 
(1977». The jury trial in Superior Court was never held since the Superior Court referred the 
question of constitutionality directly to the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. 
------------------------- -- - ---- - -
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Eastern Middlesex against the defendants Guy A. Petralia, Allan A. 
Fishman, and Joseph H. Porter, charging each of them with a park-
ing violation in the City of Cambridge.28 All three entered pleas of 
not guilty on May 14, and filed motions to dismiss. 27 The motions 
were denied on the same date, and the three defendants were found 
guilty and fined $10.00 for each offense.28 The three defendants ap-
pealed to Middlesex Superior Court, and on March 26, 1978, Defen-
dant Petralia filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of unconstitu-
tionality of the permit parking plan.29 The Superior Court reported 
the cases to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court pursuant to 
Massachusetts General Laws chapter 278, section 30A,30 which pro-
vides for an interlocutory report in a criminal case of questions of 
law "so important or doubtful as to require the decision of. . . [the 
Supreme Judicial Court] thereon before trial, in the interest of 
justice."31 On July 8, 1976, the cases were ordered transferred to the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court,32 and on April 29, 1977, 
that court upheld the constitutionality of the Cambridge permit 
parking plan.33 
m. THE STANDARD OF REVIEW IN EQUAL PROTECTION CASES 
The United States Supreme Court has developed a two-tiered 
standard of review in equal protection cases.34 The higher level of 
review, referred to as "strict scrutiny," is employed when a legisla-
tive classification is inherently suspect35 or inhibits fundamental 
personal rights.38 The lower level of review is referred to as 
21 Brief for the Commonwealth at 2, Commonwealth v. Fishman, No. 729 (Middlesex 
Superior Court, Mass., 1976) (companion case to Commonwealth v. Petralia, 77 Mass. Adv. 
Sh. 860, 362 N.E.2d 513 (1977)). 
27 Id. at 2-3. 
Z8 Id. at 3 . 
.. Id. 
30 Id. at 4. 
II St. 1954, ch. 528, MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 278, § 30A, as cited in Commonwealth v. 
Petralia, 77 Mass. Adv. Sh. 860, 862 n. 4, 362 N.E.2d 513, 515 n. 4 (1977). 
32 Brief for the Commonwealth at 4, Commonwealth v. Fishman, No. 729 (Middlesex 
Superior Court, Mass., 1976) (companion case to Commonwealth v. Petralia, 77 Mass. Adv. 
Sh. 860, 362 N.E.2d 513 (1977)). 
33 Commonwealth v. Petralia, 77 Mass. Adv. Sh. 860, 362 N.E.2d 513 (1977). 
" See generally Gunther, Foreward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: 
A Model For a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972); Note, Developments in 
the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1065, 1101-04 (1969). 
" See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 9-11 (1967). See also note 34, supra . 
.. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969). See also note 34, supra. 
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"minimum rationality"37 and is employed whenever strict scrutiny 
is not triggered. The Court summarizes its approach to equal protec-
tion challenges as follows: "Unless a classification trammels funda-
mental personal rights or is drawn upon inherently suspect distinc-
tions such as race, religion or alienage, our decisions presume the 
constitutionality of the statutory discriminations and require only 
that the classification challenged be rationally related to a legiti-
mate state interest. "38 
Under the strict scrutiny standard the Court demands more than 
a mere rational relationship to a legitimate state interest. Generally 
the Court will require that the classification be necessary to a com-
pelling state interest,3U and the burden of justification is borne by 
the state rather than the challenger.4o The Court will strike down 
legislation subjected to strict scrutiny if it is demonstrated that a 
"less restrictive alternative"41 would achieve the same end. 
In contrast to strict scrutiny, the minimum rationality standard 
of review demands a high degree of deference to legislative fiat. A 
reviewing court will not invalidate a piece of legislation on the basis 
that a less restrictive alternative exists, but rather it will uphold 
distinctions made "with substantially less than mathematical ex-
actitude."42 The Supreme Court has long recognized that: 
[R]eform may take one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase 
of the problem which seems most acute to the legislative mind. . . . 
The legislature may select one phase of one field and apply a remedy 
there, neglecting the others. . . . The prohibition of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause goes no further than the invidious discrimination. 43 
With respect to zoning ordinances, in particular, the Court has 
likewise indicated that the appropriate test is whether "such provi-
sions are clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial 
relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare."44 
"[A] reasonable margin to insure effective enforcement, will not 
put on a law, otherwise valid, the stamp of invalidity."45 
37 See note 34, supra. 
3M City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) . 
.. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944); San Antonio Independent 
School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 18 (1973). 
" See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 9 (1967) . 
.. See id. at 11; McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 196 (1964). 
U City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1977). 
" Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1950). 
" Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926) . 
.. [d. at 388·89. 
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Although the two-tiered approach is formally recognized by the 
Supreme Court, state courts46 and legal scholars47 have frequently 
suggested that the Court actually employs intermediate standards 
of review. Justice Marshall, in a series of dissenting opinions,48 has 
urged the majority to discard the rigid two-tiered formula in favor 
of a "sliding scale" of review. Under the sliding scale approach, the 
scope of review would depend on the nature of the classification and 
the personal interests affected.49 Both the intermediate standard 
and the sliding scale approaches are most relevant and useful in 
equal protection challenges where the classification is not in the 
suspect category, but is nonetheless a disfavored classification such 
as sex or wealth.50 
IV. STRICT SCRUTINY 
A. Right to Travel Not Impaired 
As indicated, in order to determine whether strict scrutiny should 
be employed or whether a rational relationship between the classifi-
cation and objective is sufficient, it is necessary to determine 
whether the permit parking plans abridge fundamental personal 
rights. 51 Opponents of the neighborhood parking programs have con-
tended that the scheme interferes with the constitutionally pro-
tected right to travel. 52 The key to discovering whether any right is 
constitutionally protected, or as it is otherwise termed, fundamen-
.. See Orsini v. Blasi, 36 N.Y. 2d 568,331 N.E.2d 486,370 N.Y.S.2d 511 (1975). 
" See Gunther, Foreward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model 
for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1972); Note, Illegitimacy and Equal 
Protection, 49 N.Y.U. L. REv. 479 (1974). 
" See San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,98-110 (1973) (Mar-
shall, J., dissenting); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 520-21 (1970) (Marshall, J., 
dissenting) . 
.. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,98-110 (1973) (Marshall, 
J., dissenting). According to Justice Marshall, the Court adjusts the standard of review 
according to the "character of the classification in question, the relative importance to indi-
viduals in the class discriminated against of the governmental benefits that they do not 
receive, and the asserted state interests in support of the classification." Dandridge v. Wil-
liams, 397 U.S. 471, 521 (1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
50 See San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 18-29 (1974); Fronti-
ero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). See also Gunther, Foreward: In Search of Evolving 
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REv. 1 
(1972). 
51 See text at note 36, supra. 
52 See Brief for the Appellant at 5, Commonwealth v. Fishman, No. 729 (Middlesex Supe-
rior Court, Mass., 1976) (companion case to Commonwealth v. Petralia, 77 Mass. Adv. Sh. 
860, 362 N.E.2d 513 (1977)). 
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tal, is not to be found by comparing the social significance of the 
claimed right as opposed to other rights. Nor is it to be found by 
weighing the relative importance of the rights. "Rather, the answer 
lies in assessing whether . . . [the right is] explicitly or implicitly 
guaranteed by the Constitution."53 
In recent cases, the Supreme Court has abandoned its attempt to 
identify the constitutional provisions which create a right to travel. 
As the Court stated in United States v. Guest: 
. . . [F]reedom to travel throughout the United States has long been 
recognized as a basic right under the Constitution. . . . Although there 
have been recurring differences in emphasis within the Court as to the 
source of the constitutional right of inter-state travel, there is no need 
here to canvass those differences further. All have agreed that the right 
exists. 55 
Again in Shapiro v. Thompson58 the Court stated, "we have no 
occasion to ascribe the source of this right to travel interstate to a 
particular constitutional provision."57 The Court then quoted the 
above passage from Guest to explain its lack of concern with identi-
fying specific constitutional sources for the right to trave1.58 
A survey of the equal protection challenges where the right to 
travel has been successfully invoked reveals a consistent case for-
mat; virtually every case involved a durational residency require-
ment which was a prerequisite to receiving certain benefits from the 
state59 or engaging in certain activities.80 In other words, the cases 
:.:, San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33 (1973). 
" 383 U.S. 745 (1966) . 
.. [d. at 758-59. 
'" 394 U.S. 618 (1960). 
57 [d. at 630 (footnotes omitted). In Shapiro, the Court states as follows: 
In Cornfield v. Coryell, 6 F.Cas. 546, 552 (no. 3230) (D.D.E.D. Pa. 1825), Paul v. Virginia, 
8 Wall. 168, 180 (1869), and Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. 418, 430 (1871), the right to travel 
interstate was grounded upon the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Art. IV, §2. See 
also Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 79 (1873); Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 
97 (1908). In Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 181, 183-185 (1941) (Douglas and 
Jackson, JJ., concurring), and Twining v. New Jersey, supra., reliance was placed on the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See also Crandall v. 
Nevada, 6 Wall. 35 (1868). In Edwards v. California, supra., and the Passenger Cases, 
7 How. 283 (1849), a Commerce Clause approach was employed. See also Kent v. Dulles, 
357 U.S. 116, 125 (1958); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 505-506 (1964); 
Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 14 (1965), where the freedom of Americans to travel outside 
the country was grounded upon the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 
394 U.S. at 630 n. 8. 
50 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630-31 (1960). 
50 See Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974); Shapiro v. Thompson, 
394 U.S. 618 (1969); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1961) . 
.. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970). 
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involved a residency classification which was based upon an indi-
vidual's having recently exercised his/her right of interstate travel. 
The permit parking cases are clearly distinguishable from these 
equal protection/right to travel cases. The facial dissimilarities be-
tween the permit parking cases and other equal protection chal-
lenges successfully invoking the right to travel are as follows: (1) the 
permit parking plans employ a bona fide continuing residency re-
quirement as opposed to a durational type residency requirement; 
(2) the previous Supreme Court cases recognize the right to travel 
inter- as opposed to intra-state; (3) the previous cases do not sup-
port a general, expansive right to travel, but rather a more specific 
right to migrate and resettle; and, perhaps a more basic distinction, 
(4) the benefit of which the non-resident is deprived in the permit 
parking cases is arguably insubstantial. 
An initial argument against successful invocation of the right to 
travel in the permit parking cases is that thus far all of the equal 
protection/right to travel challenges which have prevailed have in-
volved durational residency requirements, and the permit parking 
plans require only that an applicant be a resident at the time of his 
application for a permit. In McCarthy v. Philadelphia Civil Service 
Commission,61 the Supreme Court held that the durational nature 
of the residency requirement was integral to the abridgement of the 
right to travel. 62 In that case a Philadelphia municipal regulation 
requiring city employees to be residents of the city was held to be 
constitutional as a bona fide continuing residency requirement. The 
Court announced that the regulation did not violate the right of 
interstate travel of a city fireman whose employment was termi-
nated under the regulation after he moved his residence from Phila-
delphia to New Jersey.63 The bona fide continuing residency require-
ment in the Philadelphia ordinance was explicitly distinguished 
from invalid durational residency requirements which erect a bar-
rier to fundamental constitutional rights: 
[The right to travel] cases involved a statutory requirement of resi-
dence in the State for at least one year before becoming eligible to vote, 
as in Dunn, or to receive welfare benefits, as in Shapiro and Memorial 
Hospital. Neither in those cases, nor in any others have we questioned 
" 424 U.S. 645 (1976). 
82 [d. at 646-47. 
63 [d. at 647. 
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the validity of a condition that a person be a resident at the time of his 
application. 84 
The permit parking plans require only that applicants be residents 
at the time of their application and would thus be upheld under this 
recently announced test. 
A second dissimilarity between the permit parking cases and the 
Supreme Court cases successfully invoking the right to travel is that 
all of the previous cases concerned the right to travel interstate. 
The right to travel allegedly impaired by the permit parking plans 
was the right to travel intrastate, since none of the defendants 
crossed state lines to illegally park in the restricted parking areas. 
The Supreme Court has never affirmatively recognized a fundamen-
tal right to travel intrastate. In United States v. Wheeler,85 the 
Court indicated by way of dicta that there exists a fundamental 
right to travel intrastate,88 but in United States v. Guest87 the Court 
discredited the Wheeler dicta.8s Nonetheless, several lower court 
cases have held that the right to travel intrastate is constitutionally 
protected.8D For example, in King v. New Rochelle Municipal Hous-
ing Authority 70 the District Court for the Southern District of New 
York struck down a five year residency requirement for admission 
to public housing, stating that, "[t]o the extent that the right to 
travel derives from 'our constitutional concepts of personal liberty' 
. . . it is not dependent on the crossing of state lines, but encompas-
ses movement within the state as well."71 An in-depth analysis of 
the intra-interstate distinction is beyond the scope of this article. 
It is noteworthy, however, that the fundamentality of the right of 
intrastate travel does not carry the weight of Supreme Court preced-
ent,72 and to argue that the Court would recognize such a right is at 
most conjecture. 
14 [d. at 646 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original) . 
.. 254 U.S. 281 (1920) . 
.. [d. at 293. 
17 383 U.S. 745 (1966) . 
.. [d. at 759 n. 16 . 
.. See Krzewinski v. Kugler, 338 F. Supp. 492 (D.N.J. 1972) (requirement that policemen 
and firemen live in the community they serve held invalid); King v. New Rochelle Municipal 
Housing Authority, 442 F.2d 646 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 863 (1971); Cole v. 
Housing Authority, 435 F.2d 807 (1st Cir. 1970) (municipal ordinance requiring two years city 
residence before admission to public housing held invalid); Donnelly v. City of Manchester, 
111 N.H. 50, 274 A.2d 789 (1971) (ordinance requiring city school teacher to reside in city 
held invalid). 
,. 314 F. Supp. 427 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). 
71 [d. at 430 (citations omitted). 
72 The Supreme Court has never held that there is no fundamental right to intrastate 
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Additional grounds exist for a determination that the right to 
travel is not impaired by permit parking plans. All of the previously 
mentioned right to travel cases involved the right to migrate and 
resettle in a community, not merely the right to visit. None of the 
defendants in the permit parking cases contend that their right to 
migrate to the restricted parking areas has been infringed. What has 
been the issue before the courts has not strictly been the "right to 
travel," but rather the "right of resettlement" or, as the Court de-
scribed, the right "to migrate, resettle, find a new job, and start a 
new life."73 
In right to travel cases the right to migrate is affected when the 
durational residency requirement places a burden on relocation. 
This means that the durational residency requirement, while not an 
absolute bar to entrance, inhibits resettlement by depriving the 
newcomer of some state benefit or by restricting some activity. In 
analyzing this type of residency requirement courts will examine the 
benefit or activity withheld on the basis of recent interstate travel, 
and then determine whether the right to travel has been substan-
tially affected. Courts do not demand that there be an actual, physi-
cal deterrence of the right to travel.74 In Shapiro v. Thompson75 the 
Supreme Court held that denying welfare benefits to persons who 
had not met a one year durational residency requirement amounted 
to an unconstitutional penalty for having recently exercised the 
right to travel interstate.78 Again in Dunn v. Blumstein77 the Court 
travel. The Court has, however, discredited the dicta in United States v. Wheeler, 254 U.S. 
281, 293 (1920) that such a right exists. See United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 759 n. 16 
(1966). 
73 Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 255 (1974), quoting from language 
in Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629 (1969). See generally Note, The Right to Travel 
and Community Growth Controls, 12 HARV. J. LEG. 244, 279 (1975); Note, Shapiro v. Thomp-
son: Travel, Welfare and the Constitution, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 989, 1012 (1969). 
,. Even though physical restraint in movement is not the crux of the right to travel, the 
facts of the permit parking cases show that there was no physical restraint on movement. The 
non-resident is not actually prevented from traveling to areas that restrict on-street parking 
to residents. One's ability to travel to and from an area of the city is not necessarily cut off 
by the mere fact that one cannot park in that area of the city. Further, the Supreme Court 
has never recognized a fundamental right to travel by automobile. In a recent decision the 
Court affirmatively stated that use of a car is not a fundamental right. Dixon v. Love, 97 S. 
Ct. 1723 (1977). The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that, "nothing in Shapiro or 
any of its progeny stands for the proposition that there is a fundamental 'right to com-
munte'." Wright v. City of Jackson, 506 F.2d 900,902 (5th Cir. 1975). Public transportation, 
whether by subway, bus or taxi, is available in the areas of Cambridge, Massachusetts and 
Arlington County, Virginia where the permit parking plans are in effect. 
" 394 U.S. 618 (1969). 
71 [d. at 629. 
77 405 U.S. 330 (1972). 
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held that denying the right to vote to persons who had not met the 
one year state residency requirement was an unconstitutional in-
fringement on the right to travel. 78 The Court indicated in Dunn 
that "Shapiro did not rest upon a finding that denial of welfare 
actually deterred travel. Nor have other 'right to travel' cases in this 
Court always relied on the presence of actual deterrence."79 
The Supreme Court refined the Shapiro and Dunn standard in 
Memorial Hospital u. Maricopa County.80 In that case the Court 
held that denying an indigent emergency medical care on the basis 
that the indigent had not resided in the county for one year was an 
unconstitutional infringement on the right to travel. The Court reaf-
firmed its position that actual deterrence of the right to travel is 
unnecessary, but emphasized that the nature of the activity or bene-
fit withheld influences the decision whether the right to interstate 
travel has been unconstitutionally infringed. 81 In Maricopa the 
Court indicated that the benefit withheld, medical care, is "a basic 
necessity of life," and therefore strict scrutiny will be given to the 
statute.83 The Court implied that the fact that Shapiro involved 
denial of welfare benefits, an arguable necessity, and that Dunn 
involved denial of the constitutionally protected right to vote, was 
relevant to the application of strict scrutiny.84 Thus, after Maricopa 
the focus in right to travel cases shifted to a determination of which 
interests were so important that depriving an individual of them 
would infringe on the right of interstate travel and therefore trigger 
the strict scrutiny test.85 In order to trigger strict scrutiny, abridge-
ment of the fundamental right of interstate travel must be coupled 
with denial of a necessity of life or a constitutionally protected right. 
The term "necessity of life" has never been explicitly defined by 
the Supreme Court; however, the Court has stated that "medical 
care is as much 'a basic necessity of life' to an indigent as welfare 
assistance. And, governmental privileges or benefits necessary to 
basic sustenance have often been viewed as being of greater consti-
tutional significance than less essential forms of governmental enti-
1M Id. at 338. 
79 Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 339·40 (1972). 
K. 415 U.S. 250 (1974). 
K1 Id. at 258.61. 
K2 Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 259 (1974). 
K3 Id. at 254 . 
.. Id. at 259. 
" See Comment, The Right to Travel: In Search of a Constitutional Source, 55 NEB. L. 
REV. 117, 125 (1975). 
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tlements."88 In the permit parking cases the benefit which the mu-
nicipality is denying is permission to lawfully park one's car on the 
public street. Certainly this cannot be considered necessary to basic 
sustenance, rather it should be considered within the latter category 
of a less essential governmental entitlement. Nor is parking a right 
explicitly guaranteed by the Constitution. Under the standards set 
by the Supreme Court it is inconsequential that the parking plans 
do not present an actual deterrence,87 but the minimal significance 
of the benefit withheld, on-street parking, would seem to be deter-
minative. 
lf permit parking plans do not abridge the fundamental right to 
travel, the strict standard of review will not be triggered on the basis 
of infringement of a fundamental personal right. The possibility of 
strict scrutiny does not end here, however. The legislative classifica-
tion must also be examined. 
B. Residency Classification Not Suspect 
Determination of the nature of the classification employed in the 
permit parking plans is essential to a discovery of the appropriate 
standard of review.88 lf classification on the basis of residency is 
traditionally suspect, then a stricter standard of review will be em-
ployed.sulf, on the other hand, residency is a non-suspect classifica-
tion, then the appropriate standard of review will be whether the 
residency classification is rationally related to the legitimate state 
interests of pollution control and preservation of the residential 
character of the neighborhood. tO 
A non-suspect classification exists where: 
HI Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 259 (1974) (footnotes omitted). 
M7 In Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975), a later equal protection case involving the right 
to travel, the Supreme Court held that a one year durational residency requirement for 
obtaining a divorce is not unconstitutional. The Court might have based its decision upon a 
determination that divorce is neither a basic necessity of life nor a constitutional right. 
However, the Court did not explicitly offer this reasoning, and instead indicated that the 
dura tiona I residency requirements could be justified on grounds other than administrative 
convenience or budgetary considerations. A thorough analysis of Sosna is beyond the scope 
of this inquiry. It is sufficient here to note that the permit parking plans, as well, are justifia-
ble on grounds other than budgetary considerations and administrative convenience and that 
Sosna apparently lends no support to the successful invocation of the right to travel in the 
permit parking challenge . 
.. See text at note 35, supra . 
.. Gunther, Foreward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a 
Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REv. I, 8 (1972) . 
.. [d. See text at notes 97 -121, infra. 
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[T]he system of alleged discrimination and the class it defines have 
none of the traditional indicia of suspectness: the class is not saddled 
with such disabilities, or subject to such a history of purposeful unequal 
treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as 
to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political 
process. 91 
Using this criteria, the only classifications which the Supreme Court 
has recognized as suspect are those relating to race, alienage, or 
national origin.92 Classification on the basis of residency, in and of 
itself, has not been recognized by the Court as suspect.93 In cases 
where the Supreme Court has employed strict scrutiny in reviewing 
residency-based ordinances, the reason for the stricter standard of 
review was a denial or infringement, on the basis of recent interstate 
travel, of either a necessity of life or some constitutionally protected 
activity.94 In these cases use of a suspect classification was not the 
reason for employing strict scrutiny. As the Supreme Court indi-
cated in McCarthy v. Philadelphia Civil Service Commission,95 a 
bona fide continuing residency requirement such as is employed in 
the permit parking cases is entirely permissible and does not trigger 
the stricter standard of review. 
V. MINIMUM RATIONALITY 
The preceding investigation of the residency classification and the 
right to travel compels the conclusion that the permit parking plans 
" San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I, 28 (1973). 
" See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (alienage); Loving v. Virginia, 388 
U.S. I, 9-11 (1967) (race); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191-92 (1964) (race); Oyama 
v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 646 (1948) (nationality); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 
214, 216 (1944) (nationality). See also Strickman, School Desegregation at the Crossroads, 
70 N.W. L. REV. 725, 729 n. 16 (1976). Professor Strickman notes: 
Conditions of birth such as sex and illegitimacy, although akin to ancestry in many 
respects, have yet to be identified as suspect criteria by a majority of the Court. Jiminez 
v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628, 631 (1974); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). 
Wealth discrimination alone, although 'traditionally disfavored', remains a nonsuspect 
classification. San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, supra at 18-29. See 
also Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966). 
[d. at 725, n. 15. 
U3 In a brief opinion, the United States Supreme Court indicated that "the Constitution 
does not. . . presume distinctions between residents and non-residents of a local neighbor-
hood to be invidious." County Bd. v. Richards, 98 S. Ct. 24, 26 (1977) (per curiam) . 
.. See Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 
U.S. 330 (1972); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 
112 (1970); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969). 
95 424 U.S. 645, 647 (1976). 
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employ no suspect or disfavored classification and infringe upon no 
fundamental interests. Consequently, the appropriate standard of 
review is minimum rationality.96 Having established that a limited 
standard of review should be employed with respect to the permit 
parking plans, the crucial question becomes: Does the residency 
classification employed in the ordinances bear a rational relation-
ship to legitimate state objectives? The answer to this question 
requires a two-part determination: first, are the asserted legislative 
objectives of the permit parking plans legitimate; and second, are 
the permit parking plans rationally related to these objectives. 
A. Legislative Objectives of the Parking Plans 
The legislative objectives of the Arlington permit parking plan are 
set forth in the preamble to the ordinance: 
The County Board of Arlington County, Virginia, hereby ordains that 
in order to reduce hazardous traffic conditions resulting from the use of 
streets within areas zoned for residential uses for parking of vehicles by 
persons using districts zoned for commercial or industrial uses. . .; to 
protect those districts from polluted air, excessive noise, and trash and 
refuse caused by the entry of such vehicles; to protect the residents of 
those districts from unreasonable burdens in gaining access to their 
residences; to preserve the character of those districts as residential 
districts; to promote efficiency in the maintenance of those streets in a 
clean and safe condition; to preserve the value of the property in those 
districts; and to preserve the safety of children and other pedestrians 
and traffic safety, and the peace, good order, comfort, convenience and 
welfare of the inhabitants of the County. . . Section 29D of the Zoning 
Ordinance is enacted. . . .97 
The asserted legislative objectives of the Cambridge plan are not 
expressly set forth in either the municipal ordinance or the enabling 
statute. However, the brief for the Commonwealth states: 
While the legislature did not expressly define its purposes in enacting 
St. 1972, c. 340,[98], we are not required to blind ourselves to possible 
•• See text at note 37, supra . 
., Arlington County, Va., Amendment and Reenactment of § 29D Zoning Ordinance, Re: 
Street Parking in Residential Districts (May 18,1974), cited in County Bd. v. Richards, 217 
Va. 645, _, 231 S.E.2d 231, 232 (1977) . 
.. St. 1961, ch. 455, § 3(a) (an Act establishing a Department of Traffic and Parking and a 
Board of Traffic and Parking in the City of Cambridge), was the original enabling legislation 
for the CAMBRIDGE, MASS., ORDINANCE 73·9, § 16.4(b) (1973) (amending Ordinance 66-l). St. 
1961, ch. 455, § 3(a) was amended by St. 1972, ch. 340 which provides in pertinent part: 
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rationales that may have influenced the Legislature. . The Legisla-
ture may have determined that it was desirable to reduce use of the 
private automobile in Cambridge. Such a reduction would achieve two 
objectives. First, it would reduce the amount of air pollution in Greater 
Boston. Second, it would reduce traffic congestion in Cambridge itself.e. 
The asserted objectives of both the Cambridge and Arlington per-
mit parking programs can be divided into two major categories: (1) 
air pollution control and (2) preservation of the residential character 
of the neighborhood by reducing traffic congestion. Certain of the 
numerous stated objectives of the Arlington plan do not fall neatly 
under either category but may arguably be classified as within the 
parameters of one or both categories. For example, preservation of 
the safety of children might be considered to be a subcategory of 
preservation of the residential character of the neighborhood. 
Whether or not these two major categories of objectives fall within 
the police power of the state is the crux of a determination whether 
the legislative objectives are a legitimate state interest. loo 
1) Air Pollution Control 
State governments have broad powers to make rules concerning 
the use of public streets and the right to drive upon them. lol "The 
use of the automobile as an instrument of transportation is pecu-
liarly the subject of regulation." 102 There is little dispute either that 
public streets or private automobiles are proper subjects of regula-
tion. Neither is there any substantial disagreement that the legisla-
tive objective of air pollution control is properly within the state's 
police power to provide for the safety and welfare of the public. In 
Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. l03 the Supreme 
Any rule or regulation adopted under this clause prohibiting the parking or standing of 
vehicles on the whole or any part or parts of one or more streets, ways, roads or parkways 
under the control of the city may provide that it shall not apply in such residential areas 
as shall be specified, and at such times as shall be prescribed, in such rule or regulation, 
to any motor vehicle registered under chapter ninety of the General Laws as principally 
garaged in the city and owned or used by a person residing in such area. . . . 
.. Brief for the Commonwealth at 31, Commonwealth v. Fishman, No. 729 (Middlesex 
Superior Court, Mass., 1976) (citation omitted) (companion case to Commonwealth v. Pe-
tralia, 77 Mass. Adv. Sh. 860, 362 N.E. 2d 513 (1977)). The jury trial in Superior Court was 
never held since the Superior Court referred the question of constitutionality directly to the 
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. 
, .. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905), discredited on other grounds. 
,01 See text at note 2, supra. See also Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520, 523 
(1959); Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 783 (1945). 
, •• Silver v. Silver, 280 U.S. 117, 122 (1929). 
'113 421 U.S. 60 (1975). 
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Court was presented with an issue of statutory construction of the 
Clean Air Amendments of 1970.104 The Court considered the 
"anatomy of the statute, ... its legislative history, and ... the 
history of congressional efforts to control air pollution, "105 and left 
no uncertainty that a state's interest in controlling pollution 
(thereby achieving compliance with federal clean air mandates) is 
an interest within the state's police power. 
The states' general interest in air pollution control in both the 
Cambridge and Arlington plans is, simultaneously, an interest in 
achieving the primary ambient air standards mandated by the 
Clean Air Act.l08 The Cambridge permit parking plan is part of a 
Massachusetts federally-approved and promulgated plan to comply 
with the Clean Air Act. l07 At the time of the trial in County Board 
v. Richards,108 the County's plan had been conditionally approved 
as a method of meeting Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
requirements pursuant to the Act. IOD The fact that the parking plans 
are components of a comprehensive clean air plan lends credence to 
the municipalities' assertions that the parking plans were enacted 
partially in the interest of pollution control. The fact that the Su-
preme Court has recognized pollution conrol to be within the state's 
police power is conclusive that the asserted objective is a legitimate 
state interest. 
2) Preservation of Neighborhood Character 
Preservation of the residential character of the neighborhood in-
volved is another major category of asserted objectives. An initial 
'''' The Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857a-18571 (1970) (as amended and renumbered 95 
P.L. No. 95, 91 Stat. 685 (1977)). 
, •• Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60 (1975). 
, .. The Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857a-18571 (1970) (as amended and renumbered 95 
P.L. No. 95, 91 Stat. 685 (1977)). 
,.7 See the Transportation Control Plan for the Metropolitan Boston Intrastate Air Quality 
Control Region promulgated in Transportation and Land Use Controls, 40 C.F.R. §§ 
52.1128(a)-52.1128(b)(8) (1976). For a discussion of the background leading up to the promul-
gation of the regulation, see 40 Fed. Reg. 25, 152-70 (1975). The regulations were enacted 
pursuant to the mandate of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857a-18571 (1970) (as amended 
and renumbered 95 P.L. No. 95, 91 Stat. 685 (1977)). The plan exempts from the on-street 
parking ban in Cambridge those with a Cambridge parking sticker. Regulation Limiting On-
Street Parking by Commuters, 40 C.F.R. 52.1134(c)(2) (1976). 
, •• 217 Va. 645, 231 S.E.2d 231 (1977) . 
.... Record at 256-93, County Bd. v. Richards, 217 Va. 645, 231 S.E.2d 231 (1977); Petition-
ers Brief for Certiorari at 28a-29a (letter from Alan Kirk II, Ass't. Administrator for Enforce-
ment and General Counsel, United States Environmental Protection Agency, to Charles G. 
Finn, Assistant County Attorney for Arlington County, Virginia, Nov. 18, 1974). 
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inquiry in this area involves a determination whether the state po-
lice power is sufficiently broad to cover this objective. The answer 
is clear, for as early as 1949 the Supreme Court stated that the police 
power "extends beyond health, morals and safety, and comprehends 
the duty, within constitutional limitations, to protect the well-being 
and tranquility of a community."IIO The Court reaffirmed this posi-
tion in Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas: 1I1 "The police power is not 
confined to elimination of filth, stench, and unhealthy places. It is 
ample to layout zones where family values, youth values, and the 
blessings of quiet seclusion and clean air make the area a sanctuary 
for people."112 In Belle Terre the Court upheld a zoning ordinance 
which excluded from the village certain groups of unrelated persons 
that were thought to contribute to overcrowded conditions. The 
non-residents who sought admission to the village contended that 
the ordinance was violative of equal protection and the rights of 
association, travel and privacy,ll3 They argued that the ordinance 
did not achieve goals sufficiently important to justify the imposition 
on association, but the Supreme Court concluded that such value 
judgments are a proper matter of legislative discretion: "A quiet 
place where yards are wide, people few, and motor vehicles re-
stricted are legitimate guidelines in a land-use project addressed to 
family needs."114 
In Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. ,115 the Supreme Court 
approved the exclusion of industries and apartments from residen-
tial areas to keep them free from disturbing noises, increased traffic, 
and the hazards of moving and parked automobiles, as well as to 
provide children with "the privilege of quiet and open spaces for 
play, enjoyed by those in more favored localities."118 Justice Suther-
land, writing for the majority, commented: 
Until recent years, urban life was comparatively simple; but with the 
great increase and concentration of population, problems have devel-
oped, and constantly are developing, which require, and will continue 
to require, additional restrictions in respect of the use and occupation 
of private lands in urban communities. Regulations, the wisdom, ne-
1111 Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 83 (1949) (footnotes omitted). 
III 416 U.S. 1 (1974). 
112 [d. at 9. 
11:1 Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974). 
'" [d. at 9. 
115 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
'" [d. at 394. 
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cessity and validity of which, as applied to existing conditions, are so 
apparent that they are now uniformly sustained, a century ago, or even 
half a century ago, probably would have been rejected as arbitrary and 
oppressive. Such regulations are sustained, under the complex condi-
tions of our day, for reasons analagous to those which justify traffic 
regulations, which, before the advent of automobiles and rapid transit 
railways, would have been condemned as fatally arbitrary and unrea-
sonable. And in this there is no inconsistency, for while the meaning of 
a constitutional guaranty never varies, the scope of their application 
must expand or contract to meet the new and different conditions which 
are constantly coming within the field of their operation. In a changing 
world, it is impossible that it should be otherwise.1I7 
Thus, it is behond doubt that the Supreme Court recognizes both 
the legitimacy and the importance of preservation of the residential 
character of a neighborhood as an objective of zoning legislation. 
Opponents of the residential parking programs claim, however, that 
the asserted objectives of the ordinance are mere sham and that the 
actual objective is to create an exclusive parking privilege for the 
residents of the restricted area. 118 An analogy may be drawn to Belle 
Terre, where an argument was raised that the purported objectives 
of the zoning ordinance were merely a legitimatizing label, covering 
the true objective of "[fencing] out those individuals whose choice 
of lifestyle differs from that of its current residents."119 Both the 
majority opinion in Belle Terre and Justice Marshall's dissenting 
opinion recognized the possibility of an underlying, impermissible 
objective; but the possibility was never actually examined because 
in a minimum rationality review such examination is not properly 
within the scope of judicial inquiry. The Court will not assume 
jurisdiction over wrongful motives of the legislature. 12o 
"' [d. at 386·87. 
'" Brief for Appellant at 5, Commonwealth v. Fishman, No. 729 (Middlesex Superior 
Court, Mass., 1976) (companion case to Commonwealth v. Petralia, 77 Mass. Adv. Sh. 860, 
362 N .E. 2d 513 (1977)); Respondent's Brief in Opposition to Certiorari at 6, County Bd. v. 
Richards, 217 Va. 645, 231 S.E.2d 231 (1977). Since the ordinance is challenged as creating a 
parking monopoly, perhaps it is useful to consider a recent case where an ordinance which 
creates a hot dog monopoly was upheld over an equal protection challenge. In City of New 
Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1977), the Supreme Court sustained an ordinance which 
prohibits pushcart food sales in the French Quarter, but by a "grandfather provision" ex-
empts pushcart vendors who have operated in the quarter for eight years. The fact that a 
"monopoly" was created was not seen as determinative of the provision's constitutionality. 
See text at note 162, infra. 
'" [d. at 17 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
'~I See McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27 (1904). 
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Perhaps the most useful approach in examining the problem of 
the covert objective is to distinguish "objective" from "result." The 
result of the Belle Terre ordinance is to exclude from residency those 
individuals who have chosen an alternative lifestyle. The Court in-
dicates that the purported objectives (Le., "restricting uncontrolled 
growth, solving traffic problems, keeping rental costs to a reasona-
ble level, and making the community attractive to families")121 are 
legitimate. In the case of the neighborhood parking plan the result 
is to bar non-residents from parking in the restricted areas. Al-
though this result, like the result in Belle Terre, is unpleasant to 
those who are excluded, the objectives (like those in Belle Terre) are 
within the parameters of the state's police power and hence per-
missible. 
B. Relationship Between the Residency Classification and the 
Legislative Objectives of the Permit Parking Plans 
The final question in this constitutional analysis may now be 
raised: Is the residency classification employed in the permit park-
ing plans rationally related to the legislative objectives of pollution 
control and preservation of the residential character of 
neighborhoods? The answer begins to emerge upon examination of 
two cases where residents were accorded certain exemptions in mu-
nicipal parking schemes. In Pittsburgh v. Alco Parking Corp., 122 the 
Supreme Court recognized the right of the City of Pittsburgh to 
distinguish between residential and non-residential parking and to 
impose additional burdens on the latter. The city justified treating 
non-residential parking differently from residential parking par-
tially on the basis that "[n]on-residential parking places for motor 
vehicles, by reason of . . . their relationship to traffic congestion 
. . ., affect the public interest differently from parking places acces-
sory to the use and occupancy of residences. "123 
A permit parking plan which restricts parking in residential areas 
to residents and guests resembles a traffic regulation establishing 
truck loading zones in commercial areas, since each land use con-
forms to the character of the adjacent zone. Parking for commercial 
121 Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 13 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
122 417 U.S. 369 (1974). 
123 [d. at 378. A city ordinance imposed an increased 20% tax on the gross receipts from 
parking or storing automobiles at off-street non-residential parking spaces. The Court said 
that, "[tJhe city was constitutionally entitled to put the automobile parker to the choice of 
using other transportation or paying the increased tax." [d. at 379. 
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or employment reasons may rationally be regarded as out of charac-
ter in a residential zone. The distinction between parking in connec-
tion with residential use and parking in connection with commercial 
use was upheld in South Terminal Corp. v. EPA,124 where the Court 
of Appeals for the First Circuit found that it was reasonable to 
exempt residential parking from the "freeze" on new commercial 
parking facilities. The court ruled that the exemption for residents 
was not only appropriate, but perhaps necessary to make a parking 
restriction program equitable. 125 South Terminal is of particular re-
levance since it reviews the Metropolitan Boston Air Quality Trans-
portation Control Plan126 of which the Cambridge parking plan is 
now a component. 127 
When the Boston transportation control plan was reviewed in 
South Terminal the correlation between parking limitations, which 
had been substituted for travel prohibitions, and a reduction of 
commuter miles traveled was recognized by the court: "While vehi-
cle use prohibition would have decreased hydrocarbon emission by 
more than the substituted strategy, the substitute seems plainly less 
disruptive and more acceptable."128 The court of appeals held that 
ample technical support had been established for the plan's strategy 
of targeting commuting trips.129 "Commuters are the largest identi-
fiable segment of the driving population. Given the significant num-
ber of vehicle miles generated by that activity, we cannot say that 
it was arbitrary or capricious to have placed major controls upon 
commuters." 130 
As indicated, the parking restrictions upheld in South Terminal 
were a compromise measure replacing proposals to impose far more 
severe burdens on commuters. The compromise evolved as a result 
of Massachusetts' failing to meet the deadline set by the Clean Air 
Act131 to submit an acceptable transportation control plan. 132 Due to 
'" 504 F.2d 646 (1st Cir. 1974). 
125 [d. at 671. 
/ '" 38 Fed. Reg. 30960 (1973). The plan encompasses the City of Boston and several outlying 
c suburbs. 40 C.F.R. § 81.19. The plan is termed a "transportation control plan" because it 
focuses upon pollutants caused mainly by vehicles rather than by "stationary sources" like 
factories, incinerators and power plants. 
,27 Regulation Limiting On-Street Parking by Commuters, 40 C.F.R. § 52.1134. See also 
40 Fed. Reg. 25152 (1975). 
'" South Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646,672 (1st Cir. 1974). 
'29 The court found that work trips comprise 40% of all vehicle miles of travel. [d. 
13" [d. at 673. 
"" 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a) (as amended and renumbered 95 P.L. No. 95, 91 Stat. 685 
(1977». 
'" South Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646,654 (1st Cir. 1974). 
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this failure, the EPA proposed a transportation control plan for the 
Metropolitan Boston Area in July of 1973.133 These proposals, aimed 
at reducing the number of vehicle miles of travel, were considerably 
more restrictive than the Cambridge parking plan. 134 After a period 
of public hearings and comment, a modified version of the proposed 
transportation control plan was promulgated. The most severe of 
the proposals were dropped, including a one-day-a-week prohibition 
on commuting. Restrictions on the availability of parking spaces 
were substituted. 135 
The EPA had suggested to the states that limitations on parking 
might be particularly effective in reducing the number of vehicle 
miles traveled, and that reduction of vehicle miles traveled should 
prove particularly effective in reducing air pollution. 136 To the ex-
tent that a permit parking plan creates a disincentive to commuter 
vehicular traffic, and an incentive in favor of other alternatives, this 
is consistent with the efforts of the EPA and various state authori-
ties to prescribe transportation control methods to reduce air pollu-
tion. 
The Cambridge permit parking plan was promulgated by the 
EPA in 1975 in yet a further set of amendments to the Boston 
transportation control plan. 137 The rationale behind these amend-
ments was stated both in terms of the general efficiency of the 
strategy and the need for expediency in light of the 1977 deadline 
for achieving primary ambient air standards. 138 The firm contention 
of those who carried the plan into effect was that parking limitations 
not only reduce air pollution but they do so relatively cheaply and 
quickly: "These strategies are employed because commuters repre-
sent the most available group for diversions to car pools and mass 
,:1:1 38 Fed. Reg. 17689, 17690 (1973). 
"" They included a total parking ban in Boston between the hours of 6 to 10 A.M. and 4 to 
6 P.M.; the imposition of a $5.00 surcharge on off-street parking; restrictions on the flow of 
traffic through the Mystic River Bridge, the Harbor Tunnels, and on the Massachusetts 
Turnpike; restrictions on the amount of gasoline delivered to retail service stations; and a 
total ban on vehicle use in the Metropolian Area applicable to each commuter a minimum 
of one day out of each work week. 38 Fed. Reg. 17692 (1973). 
"" 38 Fed. Reg. 30960 (1973). For current restrictions on parking in Greater Boston, Mass., 
see generally Transportation and Land Use Controls, 40 C.F.R. §§ 52.1128(a)-52.1128(b)(8) 
(1976). 
"" 38 Fed. Reg. 30629 (1973); see also 38 Fed. Reg. 16551, 16552 (1973); U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency, White Paper (on the problems of vehicular pollution control) (Aug. 1973). 
,:I' Regulation Limiting On-Street Parking by Commuters, 40 C.F.R. § 52.1134 (1975). See 
also 40 Fed. Reg. 25152 (1975). 
,,1M The Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857a-1857l (Supp. IV 1974) (as amended and renum-
bered 95 P.L. No. 95, 91 Stat. 685 (1977». 
414 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 6:391 
transit. Further, the work trip is the most significant single-purpose 
trip in terms of total contribution to congestion and vehicle miles 
traveled."13D 
The Arlington County, Virginia permit parking plan has a similar 
history. The state of Virginia promulgated a plan that recognized 
the importance of reducing vehicle miles traveled. Local jurisdic-
tions were left the task of selecting devices,140 and Arlington County 
adopted an ordinance restricting non-resident parking as a device 
to reduce vehicle miles traveled. The ordinance was approved by the 
EPA in November of 1974, as a "reasoned approach to address, 
among other community needs, degrading air quality due to exces-
sive commuter parking."141 Prior to the United States Supreme 
Court's reversal of the Virginia decision in County Board v. 
Richards,142 petitioners claimed that the result of the Arlington deci-
sion was to impede seriously the region's efforts in enhancing envi-
ronmental quality. 143 
That the parking plans are tied in with federal clean air legisla-
tion is by no means conclusive of their constitutionality. However, 
the previous discussion reveals that it is well-recognized that the 
imposition of additional burdens on a class of "non-resident par-
kers" will reduce vehicle miles traveled. Reduction of vehicle miles 
traveled is a primary means of air pollution control. It is logical to 
conclude, therefore, that the residency classification employed in 
the permit parking plans is rationally related to the goal of pollution 
control. Further, the Fourteenth Amendment does not "require ab-
solute equality or precisely equal advantages,"I44 nor does the Con-
stitution require "things which are different in fact ... to be 
treated in law as though they were the same. Hence, legislation may 
,,,. 40 Fed. Reg. 25159 (1975). 
II. 38 Fed. Reg. 33702, 33706-07 (1973). 
"' Letter from Alan G. Kirk II, Assistant Administrator for Enforcement and General 
Counsel, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, to Charles G. Finn, Assistant County Attor-
ney for Arlington County, Virginia (Nov. 18, 1974). Petitoner's Brief for Certiorari at 28a-29a, 
County Bd. v. Richards, 217 Va. 645, 231 S.E.2d 231 (1977). 
II. 217 Va. 645, 231 S.E.2d 231 (1977). 
"' Petitioners Brief for Certiorari at 6-7, County Bd. v. Richards, 217 Va. 645, 231 S.E.2d 
231 (1977). See Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Certiorari 
at 3, County Bd. v. Richards 217 Va. 645, 231 S.E.2d 231 (1977); Brief of Amicus Curiae 
Montgomery County, Maryland in Support of Certiorari at 16, County Bd. v. Richards, 217 
Va. 645, 231 S.E.2d 231 (1977). Arlington County and other component jurisdictions of the 
Metropolitan Washington Council of Goverments have been working cooperatively as the 
National Capital Interstate Air Quality Planning Committee (AQPC) in the interest of devel-
oping air quality and transportation control plans for the region. 
"' Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 612 (1974). 
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impose special burdens upon defined classes in order to achieve 
permissible ends."145 Thus if residential and non-residential parking 
present different problems with respect to traffic congestion, and if 
they are in conformity with differing land uses, a municipal ordi-
nance which treats the two classes of parking differently is certainly 
reasonable. 
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court agreed that the dis-
parity of treatment was rational given the goals of the permit park-
ing plan. 14ft The court stated: 
The discrimination made by the Cambridge regulation is based ration-
ally on the use or non-use of a motor vehicle. A resident who parks near 
his home is not using his automobile, whereas a person who parks in an 
area away from his home has used his vehicle and thus has contributed 
to the problems which the Cambridge regulation seeks to address. The 
rational distinction made by the Cambridge regulation is founded on 
vehicle use. Place of residence is merely a reasonable means of measur-
ing that use.147 
Why was there a contrary result at the state court level in County 
Board v. Richards?148 What persuaded the Virginia Supreme Court 
that "the classification created by this ordinance bears no reasona-
ble relation to its stated objectives and. . . on its face offends the 
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment"?149 
Perhaps further examination will reveal a particularly arbitrary 
aspect of the Arlington plan which is absent in the Cambridge plan. 
As discussed previously, the Cambridge ordinance allows any Cam-
bridge resident who (}wns vehicles principally garaged in Cambridge 
to obtain a permit sticker authorizing parking in any "parking-by-
permit-only" zone throughout the city. The Arlington ordinance, on 
the other hand, permits only those residents of the limited area 
covered by the plan to obtain a parking sticker, which is effective 
only within the same limited area. Respondent Richards in County 
Board v. Richards argued that the particular inequity of the Arling-
ton plan was that the plan failed to treat all citizens alike, even 
within the same neighborhood. 
Rudolph Richards, although living on a street not under the plan, lives 
in the identical neighborhood covered by the plan. His home is one block 
,,, Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 309 (1966) (citations omitted). 
u, Commonwealth v. Petralia, 77 Mass. Adv. Sh. 868, 362 N.E.2d 513, 518 (1977). 
,,, [d. 
u. County Bd. v. Richards, 217 Va. 645, 231 S.E.2d 231, (1977). 
'" 217 Va. at _, 231 S.E.2d at 235. 
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away from the streets reserved for his neighbors (Rec. 81). Richards does 
not have parking restrictions in the public street in front of his house 
(Rec. 91). Anyone can park in front of his house including his neighbors 
privileged by the Plan. Richards cannot park in front of his said neigh-
bor's house. 15o 
This set of facts could not occur under the present Cambridge plan. 
Under an earlier Cambridge parking plan,151 which did not authorize 
all city residents to obtain a permit (like the Arlington plan), Mr. 
Richards' situation was a possibility. It is noteworthy that the first 
Cambridge plan was dismissed as unconstitutional by the Third 
District Court of Eastern Middlesex County, Massachusetts, on the 
grounds that the plan discriminated impermissibly among Cam-
bridge residents in violation of the equal protection clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 152 That court indicated that a permit pro-
gram available to all Cambridge residents would be valid, 153 and the 
traffic director thereafter altered the permit parking program to its 
present form. 154 
150 Respondents Brief in Opposition to Certiorari at 6, County Bd. v. Richards, 217 Va. 645, 
231 S.E.2d 231 (1977). 
'51 St. 1972, ch. 340 appears literally to authorize stickers only for persons residing in a 
specified residential area where parking is authorized by permit only. In 1974 the Third 
District Court of Eastern Middlesex ruled that a regulation which did not authorize all city 
residents to obtain a sticker discriminated impermissibly among Cambridge residents in 
violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. That court indicated 
that a parking program available to all Cambridge residents would be valid. Commonwealth 
v. Sorett, (Middlesex District Court, Mass., 1974) (unreported opinion reprinted in Brieffor 
the Commonwealth at 71-73, Commonwealth v. Petralia, 77 Mass. Adv. Sh. 860, 362 N.E.2d 
513 (1977)). The traffic director apparently thereafter altered the parking sticker program 
to make stickers available to all residents of Cambridge who owned vehicles principally 
garaged in Cambridge. Thus the "earlier" Cambridge plan seems but a different application 
of the present enactment. 
15' Commonwealth v. Petralia, 77 Mass. Adv. Sh. 860, 863 n. 6, 362 N.E.2d 513, 516 n. 6 
(1977). In Commonwealth v. Sorett, (Middlesex District Court, Mass., 1974) (unreported 
opinion reprinted in Brief for the Commonwealth at 71-73, Commonwealth v. Petralia, 77 
Mass. Adv. Sh. 860, 362 N.E.2d 513 (1977)), Judge Arthur Sherman ruled that the then 
existing parking plan was "violative of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment." He went on to state, however: 
It is our view that a Permit Parking Program which permits residents whose automobiles 
are registered in the City of Cambridge to park on the streets of Cambridge during certain 
hours but which does not permit residents of other municipalities whose vehicles are not 
registered in the City of Cambridge to park in such streets would be valid .... 
Sorett, reprinted in Brief for the Commonwealth at 71-73, Commonwealth v. Petralia, 77 
Mass. Adv. Sh. 860, 362 N.E.2d 513 (1977). 
'53 [d. 
,,, In its present state the plan provides permits for all Cambridge residents, covering all 
permit-restricted areas of the city. The court indicated its support of parking limitations as 
a means of achieving the stated legislative objectives when it stated: 
, 
.. 
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Although not expressly stated in Commonwealth u. Petralia, 155 
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court found no constitutional 
infirmity in a scheme such as the prior Cambridge and Arlington 
plans which limit parking stickers to residents of the restricted 
area. 15S The court did not expressly rule on the· constitutionality of 
the prior Cambridge plan, as that issue was not properly before it. 
However, the court did express its opinion as to why the Arlington 
plan was struck down, and the limiting of stickers to residents of the 
restricted streets was not viewed as determinative. 157 This view ap-
pears to be consistent with the constitutional standard that, 
"[l]egislative classifications need not be perfect in order to survive 
a challenge on equal protection grounds. "158 Certainly by this stan-
dard, the existence of one possibly inequitable set of circumstances 
(such as Mr. Richards') would not be sufficient to invalidate the 
plan. 
The Virginia Supreme Court did not find the matter of limiting 
[I]f the [present] regulation were constitutionally invalid for favoring residents of Cam-
bridge who do not live in the East Cambridge restricted parking area in preference to non-
residents, the appropriate judicial remedy might be to deny parking rights to such resi-
dents of Cambridge as well as to the defendant. Such a solution would achieve the purpose 
of the regulation better than granting parking rights to everyone by striking down the 
regulation in its entirety. 
Commonwealth v. Petralia, 77 Mass. Adv. Sh. 860, 868 n. 7, 362 N.E.2d 513,518 n. 7 (1977) 
(emphasis added) . 
, .. 77 Mass. Adv. Sh. 860, 362 N.E.2d 513 (1977). 
, .. See 77 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 868, 362 N.E.2d at 518. 
15' The opinion expressed by the S.J.C. was that the Arlington ordinance's declared pur-
poses were to protect the zone and its residents: 
Those purposes were not founded, if they could have been under State law, on the impact 
of non-resident parking on regional considerations, such as traffic congestion, air pollu-
tion, and the encouragement of public transportation. The opinion accordingly gives no 
consideration to the possibility that a parking regulation, seemingly favoring residents of 
an area might be justified on broader considerations than those expressed by the local 
board. 
[d. at 867, 326 N .E.2d at 518. 
15' [d. The constitutional standard announced by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court is consistent with that repeatedly announced by the United States Supreme Court: 
State legislation which has some effect on individual liberty or privacy may not be held 
unconstitutional simply because a court finds it unnecessary, in whole or in part. For we 
have frequently recognized that individual states have broad latitude in experimenting 
with possible solutions to problems of vital local concern. 
Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 597 (1977). The Court went on to state that: '''We are not 
concerned, however, with the wisdom, need, or appropriateness of the legislation.' Olsen v. 
Nebraska ex. reI. Western Reference and Bond Ass'n., 313 U.S. 236, 246 (1941)." Whalen v. 
Roe, 429 U.S. at 597 n. 19. See McGowan v. Maryland, 336 U.S. 420, 426 (1961): "A statutory 
discrimination will not be set aside if any set of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify 
it." 
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stickers to residents of the restricted streets to be determinative. It 
based its rejection of the Arlington permit parking plan on the 
grounds that it is improper to give residents a "parking monopoly 
in the public streets of their neighborhood;"159 and that although a 
statute favoring residents over non-residents may reduce the 
amount of air pollution, "solutions achieved at the price of invidious 
discrimination are too dear."18o These grounds are arguably incon-
sistent with several recent decisions of the United States Supreme 
Court. Creation of a "parking monopoly" in certain residential areas 
cannot be justifiably characterized as improper and not related to 
the goals of neighborhood preservation in light of the Supreme 
Court's holding in City of New Orleans v. Dukes,181 that creation of 
a hot dog monopoly is proper and rationally related to the goal of 
preservation of neighborhood character}R2 
In Dukes the purpose of the ordinance was to preserve the French 
Quarter's values as a tourist attraction by excluding hot dog vendors 
who had not operated in the Quarter for at least eight years. In the 
permit parking cases, the ordinance is supposed to preserve the 
residential character of the neighborhoods involved by prohibiting 
vehicles owned and operated by non-residents from being parked on 
the streets of the neighborhood. One might argue, however, that 
although the ordinances are similar in purpose, the Dukes ordinance 
should be subject to a less stringent standard of reviewl83 since it 
falls into the category of "economic legislation." While the permit 
"'. County Bd. v. Richards, 217 Va. 645, _,231 S.E.2d 231,234 (1977). 
" .. Id. at _, 231 S.E.2d at 235. 
'81 427 U.S. 297 (1977). 
'" Id. at 304. 
,03 In City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1977), the Court stated: 
States are accorded wide latitude in the regulation of their local economics under their 
police powers, and rational distinctions may be made with substantially less than mathe-
matical exactitude. Legislatures may implement their programs step by step, Katzenback 
v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966), in such economic areas, adopting regulations that only 
partially ameliorate a perceived evil and deferring complete elimination of the evil to 
further regulations. See, e.g. Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 488-89 (1955). 
In short the judiciary may not sit as a super legislature to judge the wisdom or desirability 
of legislative policy determinations made in areas that neither affect fundamental rights 
nor proceed along suspect lines, see e.g. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 
423 (1952); in the local economic sphere, it is only the invidious discrimination, the wholly 
arbitrary act, which cannot stand consistently with the Fourteenth Amendment. . . . 
City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. at 303-04. The Court in Dukes overruled Morey v. 
Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957), the only case in decades in which the Court had held that ordinary 
state or local legislation dealing with business affairs denied equal protection of the laws. 
Thus, Dukes stands for yet another resounding rejection of the principles of judicial activism 
set forth in Lochner v. New York; 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
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parking ordinances are dissimilar to the Dukes ordinance in that 
they are social rather than economic legislation, this argument must 
nevertheless fail. The Court stated in Village of Belle Terre v. 
Boraas l64 that with respect to both "economic and social legislation 
... legislatures have historically drawn lines which we respect 
against the charge of violation of the Equal Protection Clause if the 
law be 'reasonable, not arbitrary' ... and bears 'a rational relation-
ship to a [permissible] state objective.' "165 
Whether an ordinance exacts a price "too dear"166 in relation to 
its objectives is a legislative judgment, not a judicial judgment, and 
it is immaterial that the benefits of the ordinance may not have 
been established to the court's satisfaction. 167 Nonetheless, the Ar-
lington permit parking ordinance serves values no less important 
than those at stake in Belle Terre. There, an incidental infringe-
ment on the right of association was not too great a price to pay for 
preservation of the character of the neighborhood. In Young v. 
American Mini Theatres, Inc., 168 an ordinance drew a line between 
adult movie theatres and others and restricted where the former 
could be operated. The result reached in Young indicates that an 
incidental infringement on First Amendment rights will not be con-
sidered too great a price for preservation of the character of the 
neighborhood. The Court stated, "the city's interest in attempting 
to preserve the quality of urban life is one that must be accorded 
high respect. Moreover, the city must be allowed to experiment with 
solutions to admittedly serious problems."169 
The Virginia Supreme Court in County Board v. Richards l70 did 
\fl. 416 U.S. 1 (1974). 
\fl' Id. at 8 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). As the petitioners in County Bd. v. 
Richards, 217 Va. 645. 231 S.E.2d 231 (1977) argued with respect to the commuter's evidence 
at trial: 
[E)ven if they had shown that the ordinance had been a failure, that it was wholly 
unnecessary - which they did not - such a showing would be relevant . . . only if 
Lochner u. New York [198 U.S. 45 (1905») were still good law. In Whalen v. Roe [429 
U.S. 589 1977») the court said that contrary to the holding of Lochner 'State legislation 
which has some effect on individual liberty or privacy may not be held unconstitutional 
simply because a court finds it unnecessary, in whole or in part.' [Whalen v. Roe, 429 
U.S. at 597). 
Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 15, County Bd. v. Richards, 217 Va. 645, 231 S.E.2d 231 
(1977) . 
... County Bd. v. Richards, 217 Va. 645, _, 231 S.E.2d 231,235 (1977). 
'67 Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 597 (1977). 
'" 427 U.S. 50 (1976). 
\fl. Id. at 71. See Comment, Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc.: The War on Neighbor-
hood Deterioration Leaves First Amendment Casualty, 6 ENV. AFF. 101, 112 (1977). 
170 217 Va. 645, 231 S.E.2d 231 (1977). 
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not limit its review to whether the classification was rational in 
relation to the objectives of the ordinance. Instead it engaged in a 
balancing of the personal inequities and social benefits of the ordi-
nance and concluded that the ordinance exacted a price "too 
dear."171 The Virginia decision may be criticiz·ed on the basis that 
such balancing exceeds the proper scope of review. The Supreme 
Court has repeatedly renounced the past era of judicial activism.172 
The Court maintains that its role is not legislative, and that under 
the minimum rationality standard of review it is immaterial 
whether the challenged legislation seems unnecessary or unwise. 173 
VI. CONCLUSION 
A constitutional analysis of Commonwealth u. Petralia l74 and 
County Board u. Richardsl75 compels the conclusion that the permit 
parking plans do not violate the equal protection clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. Since classification on the basis of residency is 
not traditionally suspect, and since the permit parking plans do not 
abridge the fundamental right to travel, the strict scrutiny standard 
of review is not triggered. The plans withstand minimum rationality 
review: the legislative classification on the basis of residency is ra-
tionally related to the legitimate state objectives of air pollution 
control and preservation of the residential character of neighbor-
hoods. Thus, the Supreme Court's reversal of the Virginia decision 
was appropriate. 
In reversing the Virginia court, the Supreme Court once again 
reminds reviewing courts that it is unacceptable to overstep judicial 
bounds and intrude into an area of legislative judgment. Under 
minimum rationality review the wisdom of challenged legislation is 
not at issue. Yet it is hardly difficult to understand why the permit 
parking plans would be considered unwise by some. Many dislike 
171 This balancing test may be appropriate in a case involving a First Amendment chal-
lenge such as Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976). County Bd. v. Richards, 
217 Va. 645, 231 S.E.2d 231 (1977) involved no such First Amendment challenge. As well, a 
balancing test is arguably appropriate in an equal protection challenge which successfully 
invokes the right to travel. See Comment, The Right to Travel: In Search of a Constitutional 
Source, 55 NEB. L. REV. 117, 126-27 (1975); Comment The Right to Travel-Quest for a 
Constitutional Source, 6 RUT.-CAM. L. J. 122, 134-35 (1974). Since the court in County Bd. 
v. Richards, 217 Va. 645, 231 S.E.2d 231 (1977), never even acknowledged the right to travel 
argument, such a justification of the balancing test cannot be made. 
172 See note 165, supra. 
173 [d. 
,,, 77 Mass. Adv. Sh. 860,362 N.E.2d 513 (1977). 
,75 217 Va. 645, 231 S.E.2d 231 (1977). 
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the personal inconvenience attendant to such restrictions. Many 
simply resent what they feel to be unfair and unnecessary govern-
mental intervention. Such attitudes will not be easily changed and, 
unfortunately, may prove to be an impediment to the achievement 
of a clean, healthy environment. Certainly the adoption of any 
transportation control strategy will inconvenience selected individ-
uals; indeed, any strategy is "bound to come between the citizen 
and his automobile."176 As the Second Circuit stated with respect 
to New York clean air legislation: 177 
We are aware that enforcement of the air quality plan might well cause 
inconvenience and expense to both governmental and private parties, 
particularly when a congested metropolitan community provides the 
focal point of the controversy. But Congress decreed that whatever time 
and money might otherwise be saved should not be gained at the ex-
pense of the lungs and health of the community's citizens. m 
'" South Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646,654 (1st Cir. 1974). 
177 Proposed Transportation Control Plan for the Metropolitan New York City Area. See 
Friends of the Earth v. EPA, 499 F.2d 1119 (2d Cir. 1974), for a detailed discussion of the 
history of New York's steps toward compliance with the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857a-
18571 (1970) (as amended and renumbered 95 P.L. No. 95, 91 Stat. 685 (1977)). 
'" Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 535 F.2d 165, 179 (2d Cir. 1976). 
